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The fascination of what’s difficult 
Has dried the sap out of my veins, and rent 
Spontaneous joy and natural content 
Out of my heart. There’s something ails our colt 
That must, as if it had not holy blood 
Nor on Olympus leaped from cloud to cloud, 
Shiver under the lash, strain, sweat and jolt 
As though it dragged road-metal. My curse on plays 
That have to be set up in fifty ways, 
On the day’s war with every knave and dolt, 
Theatre business, management of men. 
I swear before the dawn comes round again 
I’ll find the stable and pull out the bolt.1 
—W.B. Yeats 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA)2 introduced the most 
significant changes to the United States patent system in more than fifty years.3  
To some, the AIA has been an efficient means to cancel dubious patents.4  To 
others, it is a system that too easily revokes granted patent rights.5  All can agree, 
however, that the AIA has created a host of novel legal issues for the Federal 
Circuit and the United States Supreme Court. 
                                                 
 1. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Fascination of What’s Difficult, in T HE COLLECTED 
POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 88 (Richard J. Finneran, ed., 1989).  In an outline of this poem, Yeats wrote 
in his diary, “Subject: To complain at the fascination of what ’s difficult.  It  spoils spontaneity and 
pleasure, and wastes time.”  A. NORMAN JEFFARES, A COMMENTARY ON THE COLLECTED POEMS 
OF W.B. YEATS 106 (1968). 
 2. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in scattered sections of 
35 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 3. See, e.g., P. Andrew Riley, Jonathan R.K. Stroud & Jeffrey Totten, The Surprising 
Breadth of Post-Grant Review for Covered-Business-Method Patents: A New Way to Challenge 
Patent Claims, 15 COLUM. SCI. & T ECH. L. REV. 235, 241 (2014); Paul Michel & Matthew J. 
Dowd, The Uncertain State of Patent Law 10 Years into The Roberts Court, INTELLECTUAL ASSET 
MANAGEMENT, Nov./Dec. 2016, at 27. 
 4. Riley et al., supra note 3, at 240. 
 5. See Michel & Dowd, supra note 3, at 33. 
2018] Standing to Appeal at the Federal Circuit 663 
One such issue concerns standing under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.   Standing is one of the most fundamental prerequisites for litigants  
in federal courts.6  It constitutionally ensures that federal courts hear only 
“cases” or “controversies” and avoid advisory opinions or political questions.7 
The AIA authorizes anyone,8 except the patent owner, to seek cancellation of 
patent claims through its post-grant proceedings.9  But an administrative 
petitioner seeking to cancel a patent before the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) may not be able to establish independent Article III 
standing.  While Article III standing is not required to participate in agency 
proceedings such as AIA reviews, it does limit who can participate in the review 
of the agency’s final decision at the district or appellate level.10  That disconnect 
has led to uncertainty over whether all petitioners can seek judicial review of 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) final decisions. 
Until recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had 
rarely ruled directly on appellate standing for administrative appeals.11  The 
Federal Circuit had, of course, ruled on standing related to district court patent 
litigation,12 but only recently did it directly address Article III standing in 
                                                 
 6. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“All of the doctrines that cluster about 
Article III—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like—relate in 
part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less 
than a rigorous and explicit  theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of 
an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”) (quotation omitted). 
 7. U.S. CONST. art . III, § 2, cl. 1.  See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) 
(“Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”). 
 8. The Supreme Court recently granted a petition for certiorari in Return Mail, Inc. v. United 
States Postal Service, No. 17-1594, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2018), directed to the following 
question: “Whether the government is a “person” who may petition to institute review proceedings 
under the AIA.” 
  The appeal below referred to section 18(a)(1)(B) of the transitional covered business 
method proceeding set to sunset in 2020, which reads: “A person may not file a petition for a 
transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the 
person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been 
charged with infringement under that patent.”  Leahy Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 329 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. § 321). 
  However, as the AIA’s governing statute for inter partes review (IPR) also includes the 
“person” language, the case will likely determine whether government agencies or organizations 
may petition for patent review. 
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 321(a) (2012). 
 10. See Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara Cty., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 432–
33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 11. See Syntex (USA) Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 882 F.2d 1570, 1575 –76 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989) (discussing earlier cases on the issue); see also Boeing Co. v. Comm’r of Patents & 
Trademarks, 853 F.2d 878, 881–82 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 12. See, e.g., Prasco LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(demonstrating standing in a Declaratory Judgment Act case). 
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appeals.13  These cases, while establishing some guidance, leave significant 
appellate standing questions unanswered. 
With a limited body of patent-related standing cases from which to draw, the 
Federal Circuit runs the risk of fashioning an overly narrow, patent-specific 
standing jurisprudence if it does not consider the broader law addressing 
standing in appeals from all agency actions.  Even the Federal Circuit’s pre-AIA 
standing jurisprudence has been criticized as too restrictive.14  The AIA’s 
statutory purpose of a broad review of patents arguably broadened standing to 
the constitutional maximum when it authorized judicial review by any party 
“dissatisfied with the final written decision.”15 
We fill a gap in the literature concerning Article III standing to challenge 
patents under the AIA regime.16  First, we provide a background of standing 
requirements under Article III, with emphasis on appeals from federal agency 
litigation.  A substantial body of non-patent-related case law already addresses 
the question of standing on direct appeal from an agency decision; we draw on 
those examples.17 
Next, we turn to the issue of standing of appellants, appellees, intervenors, 
and amici.  Standing considerations differ, depending on the status of the entity.  
Under current Federal Circuit law, an appellant, as the party invoking the court’s 
jurisdiction, must demonstrate Article III standing; an appellee need not have 
independent standing.18  The Federal Circuit has but once addressed intervenor 
standing in AIA appeals.19  The Supreme Court’s recently explicated rule is that 
                                                 
 13. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 –61 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014); see also PPG Indus. v. Valspar Sourcing, Inc., 679 Fed. App’x 1002, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). 
 14. Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
498, 500 (2015) (contending that “the Federal Circuit has misconceived the injury that arises from 
even the mere existence of a patent, has crafted patent -specific standing rules that are more 
restrictive than those called for under the Supreme Court ’s broader standing precedents, and has 
created a misalignment between those who have the incentive to challenge patents and those who 
have standing to do so”); John F. Duffy, Standing to Challenge Patents, Enforcement Risk, and 
Separation of Powers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 643 (2015) (“ [E]ven within the Federal 
Circuit’s own jurisprudence, there’s a glaring inconsistency in how the court measures standing to 
challenge governmental grants of patent rights versus how it  measures standing to challenge other 
governmental grants to competitors.”). 
 15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 319, 329 (2012). 
 16. For other useful scholarship on appellate standing, see generally Amy J. Wildermuth & 
Lincoln L. Davies, Standing, On Appeal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 957 (2010); Joan E. Steinman, 
Irregulars: The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not Full-Fledged Parties, 39 GA. L. REV. 
411, 414–15 (2005); Joan E. Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and 
the Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 816–17 (2004) 
[hereinafter Steinman, Shining a Light]. 
 17. A majority of that case law has been developed by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, given its jurisdiction over direct appeals from several federal 
agencies. 
 18. See Pers. Audio, LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  
 19. Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Iancu, 886 F.3d 1369, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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an intervenor must have standing when it seeks relief not identical to the relief 
sought by the plaintiff, though the Federal Circuit may have sidestepped that by 
indicating the Director has independent standing to intervene.20  An amicus, of 
course, need not have standing, filing generally at the permission of the court 
and parties.21  Additionally, we note that the Supreme Court has recently asked 
for the Solicitor General’s views on the issue of appellate standing in RPX v. 
Chanbond petition for certiorari, which suggests the high court may soon weigh 
in.22 
We conclude by exploring various procedural and strategic issues associated 
with standing in appeals from the PTAB.  The Federal Circuit is breaking new 
ground, having to make fact-based standing determinations for the first time on 
appeal.  This creates an awkward responsibility for the court—particularly 
related to sensitive evidence and evidentiary scope—but there are options, 
including looking to the D.C. Circuit’s longstanding procedures for guidance.  
For the parties involved, there are strategic considerations—what evidence to 
marshal and when, which arguments to advance, and the timing of when 
standing should be addressed. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Constitutional Justiciability Doctrine 
The Constitution limits the power of federal courts, controlling which disputes 
they may entertain.  Pursuant to Article III, the federal courts may only 
adjudicate certain “cases” or “controversies.” 23  The Supreme Court and other 
federal courts have elucidated several doctrines establishing Article III limits  
federal court jurisdiction to disputes that seek to “redress or prevent actual or 
imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation 
of law.”24  The doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness (along with the 
redressability, advisory opinion, and political question doctrines), collectively 
distinguish the justiciable from the nonjusticiable—defining the scope of the 
authority for Article III courts.25  
                                                 
 20. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1648 (2017); see Knowles, 886 
F.3d at 1372 n.2 (“The Director of the USPTO, thus, has standing.”). 
 21. See, e.g., NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate, LLC, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 
1063, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 178 F.3d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
 22. RPX Corporation v. Chanbond LLC, No. 17-1686, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2018) (“The 
Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.”). 
 23. U.S. CONST. art . III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 24. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009).  
 25. JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., An Introduction to Judicial Review of Federal 
Agency Action 6 n.58 (Dec. 7, 2016) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)); see 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (discussing standing).  
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The doctrines of justiciability all largely spring from the Court’s early opinion 
in Marbury v. Madison,26 and reflect a deep-seeded desire written into our 
Constitution to maintain checks and balances between the three branches of 
Federal Government. 
“Standing,” as understood by most courts, is a judicial notion “rooted in the 
constitutionally limited subject matter jurisdiction of [federal] courts.”27  It is 
most commonly applied to a party’s right to sue in a federal district court, but 
can also apply to a party’s right to “stand” before an appeals court.  Standing to 
sue was hinted at in Fairchild v. Hughes,28 a case concerning woman’s suffrage 
that held a general citizen lacked the ability to challenge his state’s ratification 
of the 19th Amendment, which the court deemed a political question.29  As the 
doctrine matured, courts grew adept at placing standing requirements within 
constitutional doctrine, most commonly citing the requirements of the Tenth 
Amendment and the separation of powers.30  This is, in part, because Federal 
courts are not supposed to act as “superlegislature[s]” that make broad policy-
based decisions.31  Instead, the Framers created federal tribunals to resolve real-
world disputes, with clearly defined questions of law based on facts.32  In other 
words, “the judicial power may not be harnessed into a monitoring role over 
federal agencies that should be conducted by Congress.”33 
To demonstrate the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” 
plaintiffs must meet three requirements.34  First, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
an “injury in fact” that is both concrete and particularized—that is, an actual or 
imminent injury, rather than merely conjectural or hypothetical.35  Second, the 
                                                 
 26. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  (“The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States 
in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and 
establish.  This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; 
and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed 
is given by a law of the United States.”).  Perhaps the leading scholar on justiciability, Dean Edwin 
Chemerinsky, divides it  into four distinct doctrines: standing, ripeness, mootness, and political 
question.  He notes that the first  three are constitutional while the fourth is prudential, though courts 
routinely overlap or confuse the doctrines.  See Edwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to 
Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 677–78, 683 (1990) (discussing the four doctrines, noting 
substantial overlap, and advocating for a unified approach to all such questions).  
 27. Jasmine Networks Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara Cty., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 432 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
 28. 258 U.S. 126 (1922). 
 29. Id. at  129–30. 
 30. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014); see also Steinman, Shining a 
Light, supra, note 16, at 829. 
 31. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
 32. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009).  
 33. COLE, supra note 25, at 6 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).  
 34. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 35. Id. 
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injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action.36  Third, the injury must 
be redressable by a favorable judicial decision.37 
Even when the three elements are met, principles of prudence may counsel 
against a court adjudicating some legal claims.38  This is known as “prudential 
standing.”39  The doctrine of prudential standing generally consists of three 
equitable bars: “[1] the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another 
person’s legal rights, [2] the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances 
more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and [3] the 
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected 
by the law invoked.”40  An individual court may ignore or overcome such 
considerations as vested to its discretion.  Similarly, Congress may, by statute, 
obviate any prudential standing concerns by “grant[ing] an express right of 
action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”41  
Prudential limits on standing are “essentially matters of judicial self-
governance.”42  Further, “[r]ules of prudential standing, by contrast, are more 
flexible ‘rule[s] . . . of federal appellate practice.’”43  They shield courts from 
“decid[ing] abstract questions of wide public significance even though other 
governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and 
even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual 
rights.”44 
To be sure, “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of 
which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”45  
But just how far Congress may go to spark such standing is unclear.  In Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court distinguished Congress’s ability to 
expand categories of standing, which may in effect lower certain litigants’ 
burden regarding redressability and immediacy if a procedural right is triggered, 
                                                 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at  561. 
 38. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).  
 39. Id. at  12. 
 40. Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).  
 41. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
 42. Id. at  500. 
 43. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l 
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980)). 
 44. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; see S. Todd Brown, The Story of Prudential Standing, 42 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 96 (2014) (“Technically speaking, prudential standing is not really 
‘standing’ at  all; it  is merely a judicially crafted set of exceptions to the obligation  to hear and 
decide matters that are within the court ’s jurisdiction.”). 
 45. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 n.3 (1973); Warth, 422 U.S. at 514 
(“Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement[,] the alleged deprivation of which can confer 
standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the 
absence of statute.”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). 
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from the overarching constitutional standing requirements.46  As expressed in 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, “Congress has the power to define injuries and 
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where 
none existed before.”47 
B. Article III and Administrative Standing on Appeal 
Article III standing is not required for proceedings before administrative 
agencies such as the PTO.48  Instead, “the starting point for a standing 
determination for a litigant before an administrative agency . . . is the statute that 
confers standing before that agency.”49  Courts reviewing cases appealed from 
federal agencies have made this clear.50  Thus, Congress can grant—and 
seemingly has granted—standing for virtually anyone to participate in some 
types of federal agency proceedings.51 
But constitutional requirements for standing apply just as they do to in the 
district court.52  The Supreme Court has carried over into appeals much of the 
same constitutional weight for standing required by the initial threshold for 
standing to sue in the district court.53  Both standing to sue and standing to appeal 
require the same three elements: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.54 
For this reason, courts enforce the standing requirement when a party appeals 
from an administrative agency to an Article III court.55  For instance, the D.C. 
Circuit frequently addresses standing first on appeal because that court has 
jurisdiction over direct appellate review of several agency decisions, for which 
                                                 
 46. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.7 (noting “ [t]he person who has been accorded a procedural right 
to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for 
redressability and immediacy”).  Nonetheless, the Lujan Court held that the alleged injury of failure 
to be consulted regarding overseas funding for endangered wildlife was not sufficient to confer 
standing.  Id. 
 47. Id. at  580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 48. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 49. See Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 50. See, e.g., Cal. Ass’n of Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. FCC, 778 F.2d 823, 826 n.8 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (“The Article III restrictions under which this court operates do not, of course, apply to 
the FCC.  The Commission may choose to allow persons without Article III ‘standing’ to participate 
in FCC proceedings.”). 
 51. Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 16, at 966 (explaining that the language in the relevant 
agency’s statutory grant of authority is the determinant). 
 52. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (explaining that “Article III 
demands that an ‘actual controversy’ persist throughout all stages of lit igation”). 
 53. See id. at  2661, 2668. 
 54. See id. at  2661.  This is true even though, arguably, the same constitutional doctrines that 
would apply to standing to sue do not logically apply to standing to appeal.  For example, the same 
issue of separation of powers would not logically exist of a higher court reviewing the decision of 
a lower court.  See Steinman, Shining a Light, supra, note 16, at 839–47. 
 55. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
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standing need not be demonstrated below.56  Other appellate courts do as well.57  
Although the Supreme Court has noted standing remains a constitutional 
question on appeal, one commentator notes that, “some pronouncements in 
Supreme Court opinions cloud which aspects of standing to appeal are of 
constitutional magnitude and which have been imposed by the Court in the 
interest of prudent judicial administration.”58  The Circuit courts wrestle with 
those distinctions.  As discussed below, the Federal Circuit recently held as a 
matter of first impression that a party appealing a PTAB decision—or any 
administrative decision from the PTO—must demonstrate Article III standing.59  
In contrast, the Supreme Court has suggested—and the Federal Circuit has 
followed—that a non-moving party need not prove standing on appeal.60 
For example, in ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,61 the Supreme Court held that even 
though the plaintiff-respondents lacked independent Article III standing and thus 
could not have filed an action in federal court, the Court nonetheless had 
jurisdiction over the appeal, as the petitioners had suffered “a specific injury 
stemming from the [adverse] state-court decree.”62  The Court did not question 
the participation of the plaintiff-respondents in the appeal.  To the contrary, the 
Court recognized that “[t]hese parties remain adverse” because the plaintiff-
respondents were defending the state court’s judgment, and that the appeal 
would resolve a “genuine case or controversy.”63 
No court has definitively held that Article III standing applies independently 
to appellees where appellants have standing; rather, most courts suggest that if 
the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction establishes Article III standing, then 
the inquiry is resolved.64  To be sure, some circuit cases, as discussed below, 
suggest that all parties to an appeal might need to demonstrate independent 
                                                 
 56. See id. at  899. 
 57. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 781 F.3d 299, 305–306 (6th Cir. 2015); N. Laramie Range 
Alliance v. FERC, 733 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 2013); Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 
844, 869–70 (8th Cir. 2013); Citizens Against Ruining The Env ’t  v. EPA, 535 F.3d 670, 675 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
 58. See Steinman, Shining a Light, supra, note 16, at 840–41. 
 59. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 –61 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014). 
 60. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989).  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at  617–18.  Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined this 
conclusion as well.  Id. at  633. 
 63. Id. at  619 (quoting T ileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943)).  
 64. See, e.g., Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that an 
intervenor’s standing was irrelevant when another plaintiff already satisfied the standing 
requirement); Legault v. Zambarano, 105 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1997) (dismissing the challenge to 
appellee’s standing as a “meaningless quibble”).  Certainly, there is no constitutional requirement 
that an entity or individual have redundant Article III standing to participate in a proceeding and 
defend a judgment, as evidenced by courts’ frequent practice of appointing attorneys as amicus 
curiae to defend lower-court judgments.  See e.g., Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 
(2016). 
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Article III standing.  But the dominant view reflects that an appellee is almost 
invariably in the best position to provide “that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues.”65 
Take Camreta v. Greene,66 in which the Supreme Court found that an 
opposing party “must have an ongoing interest in the dispute, so that the case 
features ‘that concrete adverseness[,] which sharpens the presentation of 
issues.’”67  Later courts have suggested this supports the idea that each party 
must prove independent Article III standing, even on appeal.  It does not.  
Camreta does not describe constitutional Article III standing, but rather, 
prudential standing, which can be relaxed by statute.68 
Notwithstanding that finer point, standing is a highly factual determination 
that is difficult to predict, so much so that the Supreme Court has commented 
that “[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.”69  
Thus, guidance about standing has limited practical value outside the confines 
of a particular case. 
C. Associational Standing 
Trade, business, and advocacy associations are common parties to PTO and 
other administrative proceedings, and present specific standing issues.   
Associations, like corporations, can demonstrate standing based on the identity 
and interests of their members.70  Associational standing is established by the 
following test: “[1] its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right, [2] the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, 
and [3] neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”71 
The Federal Circuit has not yet addressed the issue of associational standing 
in a PTAB case,72 and while a fulsome discussion of associational standing is 
outside the scope of this Article, such disputes could be another source of future 
analysis.  Many industry and professional associations are frequent filers, as was 
the case in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and 
                                                 
 65. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 
(1962)). 
 66. 563 U.S. 692 (2011). 
 67. Id. at  701 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101). 
 68. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685–86 (2013) (recognizing this 
requirement’s prudential nature). 
 69. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).  
 70. Int’l Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 282 (1986) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. 
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). 
 71. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). 
 72. Donald R. Steinberg & Vera A. Shmidt, Can an Industry Group Appeal an Unfavorable 
IPR Decision?, BNA’S PATENT, T RADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (Nov. 24, 2017), 
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Trademark Office,73 which consisted of a coalition of interest groups.74  For a 
relevant case in the closely related Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) 
context, which is also beyond the scope of this Article, look to Jewelers 
Vigilance Committee v. Ullenberg Corp.75 for a detailed discussion.  And note 
that governmental organizational standing may also play a role; at least one 
scholar, Tara Grove, has recently questioned whether governmental 
organizations should be allowed to be plaintiffs alleging “institutional 
injuries.”76 
An important issue regarding associational standing is whether claim 
preclusion will apply against the members of the association based on litigation 
brought by the association.  Like other aspects of standing, the application of 
claim preclusion against the association’s members is fact-dependent.77 
III.       APPELLANT STANDING 
To date, the Federal Circuit has only ruled on a handful of cases addressing 
standing to appeal from a PTAB decision.  The first set of cases concerns the 
question of appellant standing.  In analyzing these cases, bear in mind any 
question about standing is highly fact-dependent, and standing before the 
Federal Circuit will, in many cases, be difficult to predict.  The myriad of 
potential factual scenarios leave plenty of opportunity for further standing 
rulings from the court.  That said, the following analyses sets out a rough 
framework for how to best approach the issue. 
A. Consumer Watchdog 
The Federal Circuit first confronted the standing issue in a pre-AIA appeal,  
Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.78  The case 
                                                 
 73. 467 Fed. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 74. Id. (deciding Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 566 U.S. 902 
(2012) on remand). 
 75. 823 F.2d 490, 490, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing associational standing to appeal a 
TTAB proceeding). 
 76. Tara L. Grove, Governmental Standing and the Fallacy of Institutional Injury , 167 U. PA. 
L. REV. 3 (forthcoming 2019).  The question has tangential relevance to the recently granted Return 
Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service case, which asks whether governmental organizations are 
“persons” for purposes of the IPR and CBM statutes of the AIA.  No. 17-1594, slip op. at 1 (U.S. 
Oct. 26, 2018) (order granting cert as to question 1: “Whether the government is a “person” who 
may petition to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.”). 
 77. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 
544, 556 n.6 (1996) (“The germaneness of a suit  to an association’s purpose may, of course, satisfy 
a standing requirement without necessarily rendering the association ’s representation adequate to 
justify giving the association’s suit  preclusive effect as against an individual ostensibly 
represented.”); Int’l Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (“Should an association be deficient 
[in regard to whether it  is an adequate representative of its injured members], a judgment won 
against it  might not preclude subsequent claims by the association ’s members without offending 
due process principles.”). 
 78. 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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concerned patents relating to human embryonic stem cell cultures owned by the 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF).79  The patent challenge 
focused on whether stem cells were patent-eligible subject matter; the standing 
issue arose as an afterthought.80  According to its website, “Consumer Watchdog 
[formerly, the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights] is a nonprofit 
organization dedicated to providing an effective voice for taxpayers and 
consumers in an era when special interests dominate public discourse, 
government and politics.”81  As a nonprofit, Consumer Watchdog rarely 
concerns itself with patent rights, but the changing landscape of patent eligibility 
law, together with patent office reexaminations, created an opportunity for the 
advocacy group to push back on what it believed were invalid patents, which 
“loot taxpayer funds and force research overseas.”82  Thus, the patent challenge, 
in Consumer Watchdog’s view, furthered its institutional goals of benefiting 
consumers and the public at large. 
The WARF patents at issue covered human embryonic stem cells.83  Because 
the WARF patents were widely licensed to researchers doing embryonic stem 
cell research and held significance in the research world, Consumer Watchdog 
requested an inter partes reexamination of these patents.84  After the PTO failed 
to cancel the challenged claims as requested, Consumer Watchdog appealed to 
the Federal Circuit, seeking judicial review of the PTAB’s decision.85  As the 
party “seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction,” Consumer Watchdog bore the 
burden of establishing Article III standing, which included proving that it 
suffered an “injury in fact.”86  Because Consumer Watchdog had “not allege[d] 
that it [was] engaged in any activity involving human embryonic stem cells that 
could form the basis for an infringement claim,” the Federal Circuit held that it 
had failed to establish an injury in fact.87 
Crucially, Consumer Watchdog conceded that it had neither connection to the 
patent at issue nor the claimed subject matter, other than alleging, without 
supporting evidence, that WARF’s “broad and aggressive assertion of [its] 
patent has put a severe burden on taxpayer-funded research in the State of 
California where [Consumer Watchdog] is located.”88  According to Consumer 
                                                 
 79. Id. at  1260. 
 80. Id. 
 81. About, CONSUMER WATCHDOG, http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/about  (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2018). 
 82. Groups Challenge Stem Cell Patents that Loot Taxpayer Funds and Force Research 
Oversees: Univ. of Wisconsin Affiliate Claims Rights to All Embryonic Stem Cells Used for 
Research, PUB. PATENT FOUND. (Jul. 18, 2006), http://www.pubpat.org/warfstemcellsfiled.htm. 
 83. Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1260. 
 84. Id. at  1260, 1262. 
 85. Id. at  1260–61. 
 86. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
 87. Id. at  1261–62. 
 88. Id. at  1260. 
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Watchdog, it filed the reexamination request because “it was concerned that the 
[patent at issue] allowed WARF to completely preempt all uses of human 
embryonic stem cells, particularly those for scientific and medical research.”89 
The Federal Circuit found that Consumer Watchdog suffered no injury in fact 
because the PTAB’s decision “did not invade any legal right conferred upon 
Consumer Watchdog[,]” which “was not denied anything to which it was 
entitled.”90  It was not threatened with suit; indeed, it did not practice the 
invention and would not have been harmed by an assertion or the existence of 
the patent per se.  So while it was able to invoke administrative review, the court 
noted that “[a] statutory grant of a procedural right, e.g., right to appeal, does not 
eliminate the requirements of Article III.”91  For example, “the statutory grant 
of a procedural right does not eliminate the requirement that [a party must] have 
a particularized, concrete stake in the outcome of the [administrative 
proceeding].”92 
A statutory procedural right also “distinguishe[d] the [] inquiry from that 
governing a declaratory judgment action.”93  In the declaratory judgment 
context, jurisdiction turns on “whether the facts alleged, under all the 
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties 
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 
issuance of a declaratory judgment.”94  Applying this “all the circumstances” 
test, the Federal Circuit has held that a declaratory judgment plaintiff “must 
allege both (1) an affirmative act by the patentee related to the enforcement of 
his patent rights . . . and (2) meaningful preparation to conduct potentially 
infringing activity.”95  By contrast, while a patent challenger with the statutory 
right to appeal a PTAB decision must assert an injury in fact to establish 
standing, the injury need not be imminent or likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision.96 
B. Phigenix, Inc. 
The next case in which the Federal Circuit examined standing on an appeal 
from the PTAB—the first in the post-AIA context—was Phigenix, Inc. v. 
                                                 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at  1262. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. 
Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). 
 95. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office , 689 F.3d 1303, 1318 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) rev’d on other grounds, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013). 
 96. See Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1262 (“A statutory grant of a procedural right may 
relax the requirements of immediacy and redressability, and eliminate any prudential limitations.”) 
(citing Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007)). 
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ImmunoGen, Inc..97  In Phigenix, an appeal from an unfavorable inter partes 
review (IPR), the Federal Circuit laid out the evidentiary and legal requirements 
of administrative standing on appeal, and found that the appellant had not borne 
its burden to demonstrate that it had Article III standing on appeal.98 
While the court adopted the appellant’s legal theory for analyzing standing, it 
found that the evidence failed to prove an injury in fact.99  This is encouraging, 
as the majority of standing opinions at the Federal Circuit, not surprisingly, focus 
solely on patent infringement or the threat thereof, and limiting the appellate 
standing inquiry to just the question of infringement or threat of infringement 
could have been, in our view, unduly limiting and not in line with the broader 
inquiry endorsed by the high court and the other Circuits.  Thus, while Phigenix 
was a “loss” for the appellant, it was a win for those advocating for standing 
beyond the threat of infringement analysis typically applied by the Federal 
Circuit in declaratory judgment actions.100 
The appellant, Phigenix, was a small research company seeking to license its 
own technology relating to conjugates of an antibody with an anticancer 
agent.101  ImmunoGen gave a license for the ‘856 patent to Genentech, which 
then produced the FDA-approved drug Kadcyla.102  Phigenix contended that the 
use and sale of Kadcyla infringed Phigenix’s patent ‘534.103  Genentech declined 
to take a license for Phigenix’s patent.104  At the time, Genentech had taken a 
“worldwide exclusive license” to ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent for the use and sale 
of Kadcyla.105  Given Genentech’s existing legal obligation to pay ImmunoGen 
for the ‘856 patent license, Phigenix viewed ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent as the 
primary reason Genentech declined to license Phigenix’s patent.106  Phrased 
another way, in Phigenix’s view, the existence of ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent was 
causing financial harm to Phigenix.107 
To remedy this harm, Phigenix sought to cancel the claims of the ‘856 
patent.108  Phigenix filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition, asserting that the 
claims of ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent were obvious.109  The PTAB ultimately held 
                                                 
 97. 845 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  As a point of disclosure, this Article’s author Matthew 
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that Phigenix had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims 
were obvious.110  Phigenix then appealed to the Federal Circuit.111 
On appeal, ImmunoGen raised the issue of Phigenix’s standing in a motion to 
dismiss—a somewhat rare occurrence on appeal.112  ImmunoGen sought to 
dismiss the appeal prior to traditional briefing.113  The court declined 
ImmunoGen’s invitation for an early dismissal, instead ordering the parties to 
proceed with briefing on the merits.114 
The court faced several novel issues that distinguished this case from 
Consumer Watchdog.  The court noted that “[i]n the nearly thirty-five years 
since the court’s inception, [it has] not established the legal standard for 
demonstrating standing in an appeal from a final agency action.”115  The court 
explained, “This standard must identify the burden of production; the evidence 
an appellant must produce to meet that burden; and when an appellant must 
produce that evidence.”116 
Here, the court applied the approach adopted by the D.C. Circuit and several 
other federal circuit courts, holding that “an appellant’s burden of production is 
‘the same as that of a plaintiff moving for summary judgment in the district 
court.’”117  The court also concluded that this evidence may come from record 
evidence, or it may be supplemented on appeal; though the court, like the D.C. 
Circuit, admonished that “if there is no record evidence to support standing, the 
appellant must produce such evidence at the appellate level at the earliest 
possible opportunity.”118 
The court determined that Phigenix’s evidence was insufficient.119  By way of 
an expert declaration, Phigenix had presented evidence, on appeal, that “[t]he 
existence of ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent has . . . encumber[ed] Phigenix’s 
licensing efforts.”120  Phigenix also provided “a letter highlighting concerns over 
the ‘856 patent’s validity that its attorney sent to ImmunoGen [which] ‘under-
scores the actual, concrete controversy’ between the parties.”121  The Phigenix 
letter also stated that Phigenix “believes that it has a strong patent portfolio [and] 
‘believes’ that the ‘856 patent is invalid.”122  In short, the submitted evidence 
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attempted to establish the Phigenix’s injury—that is, Phigenix’s inability to 
license its own patent to Genentech—was attributable to the existence of 
ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent.123  
As noted, the court was unpersuaded by Phigenix’s evidence.124  The court 
relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4), which requires that a 
“declaration used to support . . . a motion must be made on personal knowledge, 
set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the . . . declarant 
is competent to testify on the matters stated.”125  Phigenix’s evidence of “[t]he 
conclusory statements in the Gold Declaration and the letter as to the 
hypothetical licensing injury . . . [did] not satisfy the requirements of Rule 
56(c)(4).”126 
Importantly, the court found Phigenix’s standing lacking, but did not reject 
Phigenix’s legal theory of injury in fact.127  The court expressly acknowledged 
that “if Phigenix had licensed the ‘534 patent to the same parties to which 
ImmunoGen had licensed the ‘856 patent, the invalidation of the ‘856 patent 
might have increased Phigenix’s revenues.”128  Decreased revenue is a classic 
financial harm that can satisfy the injury in fact requirement of Article III. 129 
Phigenix is an important case in several respects.  For one, the Circuit, for the 
first time, articulated a test and the burdens for appellate standing from 
administrative actions—one broader than the test used for establishing 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.130  ImmunoGen argued that standing was 
controlled entirely by Consumer Watchdog and, therefore, Phigenix lacked 
standing because it failed to establish any threat of an infringement suit.131  The 
court rejected this narrow view of standing, and instead acknowledged that, 
under certain circumstances, the ‘856 patent could have negatively affected 
Phigenix’s revenues.132  Second, it highlighted the type of evidence that could 
be offered, and provided guidance as to when such evidence should be presented, 
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and how.133  Thus, Phigenix’s failure on appeal was not its legal theory but its 
evidentiary failure of proof.  Third, it established that, sometimes, the standing 
issue is best decided with the merits of an appellate opinion; in others, through 
a motion to dismiss.134  These all have important procedural and strategic 
implications. 
C. PPG Industries 
The next Federal Circuit standing case was PPG Industries, Inc. v. Valspar 
Sourcing, Inc..135  The opinion was non-precedential;136 it thus does not bind 
future disputes.  However, it does provide some insight into what certain judges 
believe is sufficient to establish standing on appeal from the PTAB. 
The dispute in PPG Industries arose as an inter partes reexamination of two 
patents owned by the appellee, Valspar.137  When PPG filed the IPR regarding 
Valspar’s patents, “there was no pending district court litigation” involving the 
patents.138  There was also no patent litigation regarding the two patents between 
the parties during the length of the reexaminations.139  The PTAB concluded the 
reexaminations in favor of the patent owner, Valspar; PPG then appealed to the 
Federal Circuit for judicial review.140 
On appeal, Valspar’s first argument was that, “PPG had no standing to appeal 
the PTAB decisions because there was no Article III case or controversy.”141  In 
response, the courtsitting as a three-judge panelrequested additional 
briefing from the parties on the standing dispute.142  Part of Valspar’s additional 
briefing identified a covenant not to sue, which Valspar unilaterally granted to 
PPG.  It is reproduced in part below: 
[Valspar] covenant[s] not to sue PPG Industries, Inc. or any of its 
subsidiaries or customers (collectively, ‘PPG’) for infringement of any 
claim of [U.S. Patent No. 7,592,047] or [U.S. Patent No. 8,092,876] 
as of the date of this Covenant Not To Sue based on PPG’s 
manufacture, importation, use, sale and/or offer for sale of any 
currently existing products or use of methods and of prior existing 
products or prior use of methods.143 
                                                 
 133. Id. at  1172–75 
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The parties also briefed the issue of whether the appeal was moot based on 
the covenant not to sue.144  The court then ruled on jurisdiction and mootness.145 
In a short, non-precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit held that PPG did 
establish standing to sue at the time the appeal was filed, but that the appeal was 
moot.146  The opinion’s standing analysis is terse, but it does identify several 
pieces of evidence that guided the court’s standing determination.  The court 
explained that: 
(1) by the time PPG filed its notice of appeal in this case, it had already 
launched a commercial can-interior coating for the beverage can 
industry; and (2) PPG had received at least one inquiry from a 
customer suggesting that Valspar intended to pursue infringement 
litigation against PPG related to its can-interior coating.147 
Thus, the court concluded that PPG had standing under Article III. 148  The 
court distinguished PPG’s case from the facts in Consumer Watchdog in two 
ways: 
Unlike Consumer Watchdog, PPG is and was ‘engaged in . . . activity 
involving [the patented subject matter] that could form the basis for an 
infringement claim,’ and has ‘other connection[s] to the [patents] or 
the claimed subject matter,’ sufficient to ‘have a particularized,  
concrete stake in the outcome of the reexamination.’149 
In the court’s view, “[t]his stake is enhanced by the ‘estoppel provisions 
contained within the inter partes reexamination statute.’”150 
Although the court’s analysis is short, one point is worth noting: the court’s 
analysis appears to parallel—or at least draw from—the traditional standing 
analysis for declaratory judgment actions.  The court noted that PPG had begun 
making or selling a can-interior coating, which was presumably a product that 
PPG believed would cause Valspar to base an infringement claim on.151  The 
court also noted that at least one of PPG’s customers informed PPG of Valspar’s 
infringement concern.152  While the evidence did not show an expressed threat 
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of suit by Valspar against PPG, the evidence was similar to the type that was 
sufficient to establish standing in previous patent declaratory judgment 
actions.153 
PPG Industries is, as noted, a non-precedential decision.  It would be unwise 
to read too much into the conclusions.  Nonetheless, the opinion presents 
guideposts for establishing appellant standing on appeal from the PTAB; the 
exact force of those guideposts will likely be tested in future litigation. 
D. Mylan Pharmaceuticals 
Another case addressing appellant standing in the AIA context is Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Research Corp. Technologies.154  As of the time of 
writing, the court has not ruled on the presented standing issue; therefore, the 
following issues are raised with possible outcomes.  Mylan raises a novel 
standing issue relevant to both appellant standing and joinder of petitioners 
under 35 U.S.C. § 315. 
Mylan is an appeal from an IPR involving a patent directed to an FDA-
approved antiepileptic drug, Vimpat, which contains lacosamide.155  Patent ‘551 
at issue was owned by Research Corporation and licensed to UCB, which 
marketed Vimpat.156  The active component, lacosamide, was specifically 
claimed in the ‘551 patent but had previously been the subject of patent 
protection in two separate U.S. patents, which had expired by the time of the 
IPR.157  This IPR was filed by a generic drug company called Argentum 
Pharmaceuticals.158  Argentum was not the first company to challenge the ‘551 
patent.159  In fact, several other generic companies had already begun similar 
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litigation in district court, seeking to invalidate the ‘551 patent to ultimately 
bring a less expensive, generic version of Vimpat to market.160 
Sometime after the district court litigation commenced, several of the generic 
drug companies filed an IPR petition against the ‘551 patent.161  That petition 
was denied and those defendants were barred from filing a second IPR petition 
under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because it had been more than one year since they 
were sued for infringing the ‘551 patent.162  At that point, Argentum filed an IPR 
petition, and the PTAB instituted review of the ‘551 patent based on Argentum’s 
petition.163  Argentum’s petition was not identical to the earlier petition filed by 
the district court defendants.164  Once instituted, several of the district court 
defendants filed follow-on IPR petitions, which were essentially identical to 
Argentum’s petition.165  The follow-on petitions were granted, and the follow-
on petitioners were joined to Argentum’s petition with the understanding that 
Argentum would be the lead party presenting arguments to the PTAB.166 
The PTAB ruled in favor of the patent owner, leading to the current pending 
appeal before the Federal Circuit.167  Argentum opted not to appeal, but the 
joinder petitioners, including Mylan, did appeal.168  In response, the patent 
owner RCT filed a motion to dismiss based on a novel theory.169 
RCT’s argument relies on the statutory time bar for filing an IPR along with 
a “zone of interests” analysis under Article III.170  First, RCT argued that 
“[a]ppellants now attempt to evade the time bar of § 315(b) and invoke the 
jurisdiction of this Court by seeking judicial review of the final written decision 
in an IPR that was instituted at the behest of a different entity,” namely 
Argentum.171  RCT argued that, because the appellants’ petitions were granted 
on condition that they were joined to Argentum’s IPR, the appellants are not a 
“party” for purposes of § 319, which grants “[a] ‘party’ dissatisfied with [the] 
                                                 
 160. UCB Faces U.S. Patent Challenge for Epilepsy Drug, REUTERS (May 24, 2016), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ucb-sa-patent/ucb-faces-u-s-patentchallenge-for-epilepsy-
drug-idUSKCN0YF0 VP. 
 161. Mot. Dismiss, supra note 154, at 6. 
 162. Id. at  1. 
 163. Id. at  7–8. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at  8–9. (“The accompanying IPR petitions filed by the three Appellants were, 
according to Appellants and as recognized by the PTAB, ‘practical copies of’ and ‘substantially 
identical in content to’ Argentum’s petition.”). 
 166. Id. at  14–15. 
 167. Id. at  15–16. 
 168. Id. at  16. 
 169. Id. at  11–22. 
 170. Id. at  6–7. 
 171. Id. at  6. 
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final written decision of the PTAB” the right to appeal to the Federal Circuit.172  
RCT’s argument relies on a zone of interests argument.173 
It is too early to tell whether the Federal Circuit will accept RCT’s argument.  
At a minimum, it is a novel, untested theory applying the zone of interests 
analysis to the standing inquiry in the PTAB context.  A major hurdle appears 
to be that § 319 grants the right of appeal to any party to an IPR proceeding, and 
the generic drug company appellants were certainly parties to the underlying 
IPR.  Section 319 is even more forceful, as it expressly states that “[a]ny party 
to the inter partes review shall have the right to be a party to the appeal.”174  
Section 319 appears to be one of those statutes that expands, as broadly as 
permitted under the Constitution, the right to appeal, and litigate, under Article 
III.  In other words, § 319 arguably eliminates any consideration of prudential 
standing.175 
E. Altaire Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Paragon Bioteck, Inc.176 
The next-decided Altaire case involved the rare post-grant review (PGR) 
petition, and involved two closely related parties, Altair Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
and Paragon Bioteck, Inc.177  Here, the parties contracted that Paragon would 
pursue FDA approval and Altair would develop and manufacture a certain 
drug.178  Outside of the agreement, Paragon filed a patent application that issued 
into the patent in dispute here.179 
Once Altaire became aware of the patent, it sued Paragon for breach of 
contract; Paragon counterclaimed with a DJ action to exit the contract.180  Altaire 
filed a PGR arguing obviousness over drug lots it had manufactured before the 
relevant priority date.181  The PTAB instituted, but ultimately held that Altaire 
failed its burden to prove obviousness.182 
Standing was raised on appeal.183  Interestingly, Altaire was contractually 
bound not to manufacture a competing, infringing product for years.184  
Nevertheless, the court found that Altaire clearly intended to file an ANDA once 
                                                 
 172. Id. at  6–7. 
 173. Id. at  24 (“Appellants are not within the zone of interests required to pursue a cause of 
action for judicial review of the agency action under Section 319.”). 
 174. 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012). 
 175. See id. 
 176. 889 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2018), remand order modified by stipulation , 738 Fed. App’x 
1017 (Fed Cir. 2018). 
 177. Id. at  1277. 
 178. Id. at  1278. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at  1279. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at  1280. 
 183. Id. at  1280–81. 
 184. Id. at 1291 (Schall, dissenting). 
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its agreement terminated, and given the DJ action, injury was inevitable.185  The 
court pointed to the estoppel as compounding the harm.186  Ultimately, it held 
that Altair had standing to appeal.187 
F. JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive, Ltd.188 
In JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd., the Federal Circuit, in a fully briefed 
written opinion, held that appellant JTEKT lacked Article III standing.189  The 
court noted that an JTEKT sold no infringing goods, and thus would have had 
to establish “concrete plans for future activity that create[] a substantial risk of 
future infringement or likely cause the patentee to assert a claim of 
infringement.”190  The court here found JTEKT had not provided enough 
evidence of concrete, particularized harm, as its product design was not final and 
thus, its risk of infringing GKN’s patent or being threatened by it was 
speculative.191  The Federal Circuit rejected JTEKT’s argument that IPR 
estoppel constitutes a separate injury in fact,192 the same argument that would 
become the primary issue in RPX v. Chanbond, as we will see below. 
G. E. I. du Pont de Nemours v. Synvina C.V.193 
Roughly two weeks later, the Federal Circuit issued E. I. du Pont de Nemours 
v. Synvina, finding that an operating facility that was capable of infringing a 
method of manufacture, in that case, sufficed to confer standing on a petitioner-
appellant.194  There, DuPont was a known competitor of Synvina in the larger 
sense, and was known to at least seek to compete with methods of manufacture 
of 2,5-Furandicarboxylic acid (FDCA) that could infringe the patent.195  On 
appeal, patent owner Synvina argued that DuPont did not have standing to 
maintain the appeal, as it had not suffered injury that was actual or imminent.196  
In an opinion written by Judge Lourie and joined in full by Judges O’Malley and 
Chen, the Federal Circuit found that on appeal from PTAB proceedings, a 
petitioner-appellant “must generally show a controversy ‘of sufficient 
immediacy and reality’ to warrant the requested judicial relief.”197  Then it found 
                                                 
 185. Id. at  1282. 
 186. Id. at  1283. 
 187. Id. at  1284. 
 188. 898 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 189. Id. at  1218. 
 190. Id. at  1221. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. 904 F.3d 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 194. Id. at  1004–05. 
 195. Id. at  999. 
 196. Id. at  1003. 
 197. Id. at  1004 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)) 
(emphasis added). 
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that “DuPont ‘is engaged or will likely engage in an[] activity that would give 
rise to a possible infringement suit.’”198  The panel deemed this potentiality as 
of sufficient immediacy and likelihood as to merit appellate standing, further 
belying the context-specific nature of the inquiry.199 
H. Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.200 
Bristol-Myers Squibb markets a biologic product, Orencia®, a CTLA4Ig 
protein formulation (abatacept) useful for treating autoimmune diseases like 
rheumatoid arthritis.201 Potential biosimilar competitor Momenta 
Pharmaceuticals, in partnership with Mylan, made plans to market a biosimilar  
version, but first sought to challenge one of the patents covering the formulation, 
U.S. Patent 8,476,239 (“the ʼ239 patent”), as obvious.202  The Board instituted 
but held that petitioner failed its burden to demonstrate the claims were 
obvious.203 
The unsuccessful petitioner, Momenta, appealed, arguing on the merits that 
the Board erroneously found there was no reasonable expectation of success in 
combining the references to create the liquid protein formulations in the ʼ239 
patent claims.204 
The case has been pending for quite some time.  On December 5, 2017, the 
Federal Circuit held oral argument, with Judges Chen, Dyk, and Newman 
presiding.205  The oral argument was dedicated entirely to the issue of standing 
and the remedy for an appeal lacking standing.206 
Momenta argued in briefing and at oral argument that this IPR represented a 
“freedom-to-operate” action resulting in immediate harm, as it was at “fork in 
the road” in the development process, and that losing the ability to appeal would 
mean it would be forced to abandon its research efforts and millions of dollars 
would be wasted.207  Bristol-Myers Squibb argued the harm was speculative.208 
The decision did not issue after the oral argument; nearly 11 months later,  the 
Federal Circuit issued a show cause order after the parties indicated that 
Momenta had initiated discussions, in conjunction with its development partner 
                                                 
 198. Id. at  1005. (quoting JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto., Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 
2018)). 
 199. Id. 
 200. No. 17-1694 (Fed. Cir. argued Dec. 5, 2017). 
 201. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at *5, Momenta Pharms. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 17-
1694 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 10, 2017). 
 202. Id. at  *19. 
 203. Id. at  *2–3. 
 204. Id. at  *29. 
 205. Oral Argument, Momenta Pharms., No. 17-1694 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2017). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Citation of Supplemental Authority for Petitioner-Appellant at *2, Momenta Pharms., No. 
17-1694 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2018). 
 208. Reply Brief for Appellee at *2, Momenta Pharms., No. 17-1694 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 22, 2017). 
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Mylan, “to exit its participation in the development of M834, a proposed 
biosimilar of ORENCIA®,” which would have been the basis of its patent 
challenge and the justification for its appellate standing.209  Bristol-Myers Squbb 
argued that the case was moot; in responsive briefing on November 2, Momenta 
maintained otherwise.210  It noted that they had not yet exited the partnership, 
that they still maintained a financial stake in the development of a competitor 
product, and they noted that “[t]he concreteness of that stake is bolstered by the 
estoppel provision, which the Board’s adverse decision already triggered,” citing 
35 U.S.C. § 315(e).211  The dispute shows the difficult position the court and 
parties are put in when standing is raised based on proactive business decisions 
revolving around patent challenges, and also demonstrates how principles of 
mootness and ripeness bleed into the standing inquiry easily. As of this writing, 
the issue remains unresolved. 
I. RPX Corp. v. Chanbond212 
In RPX Corp. v. Chanbond, entity RPX Corp., which bills itself as a patent 
litigation risk reduction solution, filed an IPR against Chanbond, was successful 
in earning institution of that IPR, but lost on the merits as to all claims and 
grounds.213  RPX appealed, and Chanbond filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
Article III standing.214  RPX countered that it was not sued or charged with 
infringement, but argued that the estoppel effect and the reputational harm from 
losing a post-grant challenge conferred standing upon them.215 The Federal 
Circuit ruled in favor of Chanbond and dismissed, finding RPX had not carried 
its burden as appellant to show it had independent Article III standing.216  RPX 
forwent filing a request for en banc review, and proceeded to file a brief for 
certiorari to the Supreme Court,217 which drew amicus support from the New 
York Intellectual Property Law Association.218  When the high court considered 
the petition during the long conference, the Supreme Court called for the views 
of the Solicitor General, suggesting there is some interest and the Court may be 
likely to grant the petition.219  Its argument is predicated on the idea that the 
                                                 
 209. See Show Cause Order, Momenta Pharms., No. 17-0694 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 23, 2018). 
 210. Response to Order to Show Cause for Petitioner-Appellant at *1, Momenta Pharms., No. 
17-0694 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 2, 2018) (“This appeal is not moot because Momenta continues to have a 
concrete interest, just as it  did when it  filed the appeal.”). 
 211. Id. at  *4. 
 212. No. 17-2346 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 2018). 
 213. Id. at  *1–2. 
 214. Id. at  *2. 
 215. Id. at  *2, *4. 
 216. Id. at  *6. 
 217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, RPX Corp., No. 17-1686 (U.S. June 18, 2018). 
 218. Brief for the New York Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party, RPX Corp., No. 17-1686 (U.S. Jul. 20, 2018). 
 219. RPX Corp., No. 17-1686, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2018) (“The Solicitor General is 
invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.”). 
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estoppel provisions and the statute alone confer standing on administrative 
challengers, thus ending the inquiry—a stance in seeming conflict with that 
settled upon by the Federal Circuit in Consumer Watchdog and its progeny. 
III.      APPELLEE STANDING IN PTAB APPEALS 
Standing also arises in the context of whether a defending appellee must 
satisfy the requirements for standing under Article III.220  While there is some 
debate as to whether an appellee must show standing separately, many courts 
state that if standing is met for one party, it is met for all.221  Indeed, the issue 
has only been addressed once by the Federal Circuit.222  There is a subsidiary 
question of whether—statutorily reducible—prudential standing limitations  
might be applicable when constitutional standing is not at issue.223 
A. Personal Audio, LLC v. Electronic Frontier Foundation 
The case addressing these issues is Personal Audio, LLC v. Electronic 
Frontier Foundation.224  In Personal Audio, the Federal Circuit decided whether 
an appellee must establish Article III standing to defend a favorable opinion—
an issue rarely litigated.225  The generally accepted presumption that the appellee 
has standing is based on the risk of an opinion adverse to the appellee.226  This 
is analogous to a defendant’s right to defend.227  Although not directly addressed 
by any Supreme Court cases, the Federal Circuit granted standing to the 
appellee-petitioner.  In Personal Audio, the court sua sponte requested briefing 
on the following: 
whether [the appellee had] standing to participate in [the] appeal, in 
view of the court’s holding in Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation that a PTAB petitioner that does not 
meet the Article III case-or-controversy requirement does not have 
                                                 
 220. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) 
(explaining that “ the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III ’s case-
or-controversy requirement”); Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. United States, 987 F.2d 806, 810 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (stating that “ if one party has standing in an action, a court need not reach the issue of 
the standing of other parties when it  makes no difference to the merits of the case”). 
 221. See, e.g., Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 987 F.2d at 810. 
 222. See Pers. Audio, LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1249–50 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 223. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (explaining how Congress may relax prudential standing requirements by statutorily 
authorizing citizen suits); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685–86 (2013) 
(explaining the difference between Article III standing and prudential standing).  
 224. 867 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 225. Id. at  1249–50. 
 226. Steinman, supra note 16, at 853. 
 227. Id. at  852 (“While a silent appellee cannot lose a case by ‘default’ as a defendant in the 
trial court can under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he would be disadvantaged 
if barred from arguing to the court of appeals a version of the facts and the law that  differs from 
what the appellant is arguing.”). 
686 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:605 
standing to invoke judicial power, and thus does not have standing to 
appeal to this court from a PTAB decision on inter partes 
reexamination.228 
The court cited two standing-to-sue cases229 and ruled that “standing to appeal 
is measured for the party ‘seek[ing] entry to the federal courts for the first time 
in the lawsuit’ . . . With [the] Article III [requirement] satisfied as to the 
appellant, [the appellee] is not constitutionally excluded from appearing in court 
to defend the PTAB decision in its favor”.230 
The Federal Circuit did not discuss whether standing granted to one party 
could provide standing for the opposing party.  Instead, the court chose to simply 
quote Justice Marshall: “Because respondent has not invoked the authority of 
any federal court, then, federal standing principles are simply inapplicable to 
him.”231  However, despite this judicial hand-waving, the opinion is in line with 
other courts, which generally give the “defending party” the right to defend itself 
before the court.232 
IV.  ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING IN PTAB APPEALS 
Does an association has standing to litigate?233 
Many industry and professional associations have challenged the validity of 
patents, both administratively and judicially.234  The challenge to gene patents 
was spearheaded by the Association of Molecular Pathology.235  The Federal 
Circuit has not addressed the issue of associational standing in a PTAB case, 236 
but this may be another source of standing disputes. 
V.  INTERVENOR (& GOVERNMENTAL) STANDING 
Standing issues most frequently arise with respect to the appellant or to a 
lesser extent the appellee, but some cases also decide whether an intervenor 
                                                 
 228. Pers. Audio, LLC, 867 F.3d at 1249 (citation omitted). 
 229. Id. (citing ASARCO Inc. v Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989)); U.S. Dep’t  of Labor v. 
Triplett , 494 U.S. 715, 732 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
 230. Id. at  1250. 
 231. Id. (quoting Triplett, 494 U.S. at 732 (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
 232. Cf. Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 371 N.E.2d 728, 735–36 (Mass. 
1977) (granting the appellee the right to “present on appeal any ground which was previously 
asserted below in support of the [favorable] judgement ”). 
 233. See, e.g., Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 494–95 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (holding that a jewelry trade association had standing to represent its member s in 
opposing a trademark application before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board).  
 234. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office , 653 F.3d 
1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (in which medical associations challenged a corporation’s patent with 
the PTO). 
 235. See id. at  1333–34. 
 236. Cf. Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc., 823 F.2d at 494–95 (describing associational 
standing requirements in similar TTAB appeals). 
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satisfies the standing requirement.237  In general, with patent litigation at the 
appeals level, amici are more common than intervenors.238  In recent years, 
amicus activity has increased across the board,239 and the same surely holds for 
patent litigation.  In AIA appeals, the PTO has the statutory right to participate 
in an AIA appeal as an intervenor.240  Federal Circuit appeals therefore routinely 
include an intervenor, although the PTO intervenes in few cases.241 
An intervenor is neither an original plaintiff nor a defendant but has a legal 
interest in the proceeding.242  Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
authorizes an outside entity to intervene in a proceeding and participate “as if 
the intervenor were an original party.”243  An entity may intervene as a matter of 
right if that entity “(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal 
statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the 
subject of the action [that would be] impair[ed] or impede[d]” without 
intervention.244  Permissive intervention can occur when a statute grants the 
entity “a conditional right to intervene,” or when the person “has a claim or 
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.”245 
Gaining status as an intervenor during a proceeding is important because the 
intervenor becomes equal to the original parties and can fully litigate the issues 
                                                 
 237. See, e.g., Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017) (holding 
that, on a challenge to intervenors’ standing, intervenors of right must satisfy Article III standing 
to seek relief different from that pursued by a party with standing).  
 238. See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative 
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J. LAW & T ECH. 1, 72–73, 73 n.320 (1997) 
(explaining that “ [a]llowance of intervention or appearance as an amicus is within the discretion of 
the court[,]” but even if a party is granted permission to intervene it  must still have standing to 
appeal, whereas there is no standing requirement to file amici). 
 239. Helen A. Anderson, Frenemies of the Court: The Many Faces of Amicus Curiae , 49 U. 
RICHMOND L. REV. 361, 362 (2015) (“Amicus curiae participation has surged in recent years, 
primarily by interest and advocacy groups wishing to advance their law reform efforts and to gain 
publicity.”); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation , 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 810–11 (2004). 
 240. 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012). 
 241. See generally Craig Countryman, What can you do to maximize your chances of winning 
an IPR appeal?, LEXOLOGY (June 4, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2aa0 
e624-1baf-4627-8624-62932f95b9f2 (explaining that, since the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 143, the 
PTO “has been judicious about exercising this [intervention] authority” because the appellee is 
typically already present to defend the PTAB’s decision, making the PTO’s involvement not only 
costly but redundant). 
 242. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (defining an intervenor of right as anyone who “claims an interest 
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that 
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant ’s ability to protect 
its interest”). 
 243. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1920 (3d ed. 
Apr. 2016 update). 
 244. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
 245. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)–(2). 
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on the merits.246  For example, an intervenor can undertake all the usual actions, 
such as asserting claims and defenses, making demands for particular relief, 
making discovery requests, presenting oral argument, and the like.247  An 
intervenor is therefore very different than an amicus curiae, which is limited to 
supporting the claims and defenses raised by the actual litigants.248  An 
intervenor is a true party to the case and may even exert substantial “control 
[over] the suit.”249   
Left unanswered until recently was the question of whether an intervenor 
needed to satisfy Article III’s standing requirement.  Over the years, the federal 
appellate courts have reached conflicting decisions on this question.250 
In 2017, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether an intervenor of 
right must show Article III standing if that intervenor is seeking additional relief.  
In Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates,251 a unanimous Court ruled narrowly and 
found a solution in which the parties and the United States, as amicus curiae, 
shared agreement.252  The Court held that “an intervenor of right must have 
Article III standing in order to pursue relief that is different from that which is 
sought by a party with standing.”253  In other words, “an intervenor of right must 
demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional relief beyond that 
                                                 
 246. Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988).  
 247. See Local No. 93, Int ’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 
(1986) (discussing intervenors’ ability to present evidence); Bethune Plaza, Inc., 863 F.2d at 531 
(discussing intervenors’ ability to demand separate relief and attorney’s fees).  See generally S. 
Carolina v. N. Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 287–88 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“ Intervenors do not come alone—they bring along more issues to decide, more 
discovery requests . . . [and] make[] settling a case more difficult.”). 
 248. See Anderson, supra note 239, at 361–62 (“Yet, amici curae—nonparties who are 
nevertheless advocates, who are not bound by rules of standing and justiciability, or even rules of 
evidence, and who can present the court with new information and arguments—occupy a unique 
place in the appellate courts.”). 
 249. See Bethune Plaza, 863 F.2d at 531; Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 178 F.3d 533, 539 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (contrasting intervenors with amici). 
 250. Compare, e.g., King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 244–46 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(holding that intervenors do not need to establish Article III standing); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
630 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2011); City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 1183 –84 (10th Cir. 
2010) (noting that an intervenor must still have a related claim or defense as the party with standing, 
which this intervenor lacked); Dillard v. Chilton Cty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1336–37, 1336 n.10 
(11th Cir. 2007) (requiring an intervenor to establish standing only “when the original parties have 
settled the claims between them, and the intervenor wishes to challenge the settlement”); United 
States v. Tennessee, 260 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2001); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 829 –30 (5th 
Cir. 1998) with City of Chicago v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 660 F.3d 980, 984–85 (7th Cir. 
2011) (holding that intervenors must est ablish Article III standing); United States v. Metro. St. 
Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 
566 F.3d 1095, 1145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  See generally Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 178 
F.3d 533, 537–41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (describing cases that show conflicting decisions on whether an 
intervenor must demonstrate Article III standing). 
 251. 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017). 
 252. Id. at  1651. 
 253. Id. 
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which the plaintiff requests.”254  In reaching this holding, the Court relied on the 
rule that “[a]t least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief  
requested in the complaint.”255 
More directly related to PTAB appeals is the Federal Circuit appeal in 
Knowles Electronics LLC v. Iancu.256  In Knowles, the patent owner appealed 
from an adverse inter partes reexamination decision.257  The PTAB rejected 
certain patent claims directed at the silicon condenser microphone “package.”258  
The party who had successfully requested the reexamination declined to 
participate in the appeal.259  The PTO sought to defend the PTAB’s decision as 
an intervenor.  After full briefing, during oral argument at the Federal Circuit, 
Judge Newman raised the issue of the PTO’s ability to intervene in the case, 
even though the appellant did not challenge the PTO’s right to participate.260  
After the appeal was fully briefed and argued, the Federal Circuit issued the 
following order sua sponte: 
a. When the prevailing party in an inter partes reexamination 
proceeding before the USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(“Board”) declines to appear before this court to defend the decision 
below, is the USPTO’s Director required to possess Article III 
standing in order to intervene? 
b. If yes, does the Director possess such standing in this appeal? 
c. Additionally, if the Director does in fact possess standing; must the 
Director defend the Board’s decision? Alternatively, what are the 
ramifications if the Director declines to defend the Board’s 
decision?261 
In the briefing, the PTO relied on Town of Chester and explained that, while 
“a plaintiff—or person seeking relief from a federal court—must show ‘a 
personal stake in the outcome[,]’ . . . [o]ther parties, such as defendants, 
appellees, or intervenors who are not seeking affirmative relief, need not have 
constitutional standing for a case to proceed.”262  The PTO also argued that, even 
                                                 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Iancu, 886 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (formerly Knowles Elecs. 
LLC v. Matal). 
 257. Id. at  1371. 
 258. Id. at  1372. 
 259. Id. at  n.1. 
 260. See Order at 2, Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Matal, No. 2016-1954 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2017). 
 261. Id.  The third question is beyond the scope of the present article but raises an important 
question about the PTO’s role as intervenor.  See generally Dimtry Karshtedt, Acceptance Instead 
of Denial: Pro-Applicant Positions at the PTO, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & T ECH. L. 319, 342–46 (2017). 
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if Knowles is an intervenor, he had a personal stake in the outcome, thus 
conferring standing.263 
In its supplemental briefing, the appellant did not substantially disagree with 
the PTO’s position.264  Thus, it seemed likely that the court will hold that the 
PTO need not independently establish Article III standing if it is merely arguing 
a position to support the PTAB’s decision.  That would have been consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Chester and it would have 
confirmed the PTO’s authority to defend the PTAB’s decisions on appeal, 
regardless of whether the patent challenger continues through appeal. 
Ultimately the court held, in a long footnote, that the USPTO Director had 
standing to appeal, but did so in a way that left open whether an intervenor need 
establish independent Article III standing.265  Instead, the court relied heavily on 
the statement from the Supreme Court in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. 
Lee that “the [USPTO] may intervene in a later Judicial proceeding to defend its 
decision—even if the private challengers drop out”266: 
There is no dispute Knowles has standing since its patent has been 
judged unpatentable and therefore it has presented ‘a justiciable case 
or controversy.’  ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989).  
The Director of the USPTO has an unconditional statutory “right to 
intervene in an appeal from a [PTAB] decision.”  35 U.S.C. § 143; see 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §7(e), 125 
Stat. 284, 315 (2011) (stating that the Director’s right to intervene 
“shall be deemed to extend to inter partes reexaminations that are 
requested under section 311 of such title before the effective date” of 
the America Invents Act). Our precedent allows the USPTO to 
intervene to defend a PTAB decision when a petitioner withdraws on 
appeal, necessarily implying jurisdiction.  See, e.g., NFC Tech., LLC 
v. Matal, 871 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re NuVasive, Inc., 
842 F.3d 1376, 1379 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 
LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom., Cuozzo 
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016).  We 
follow the Supreme Court guidance in Cuozzo that “the [USPTO] may 
intervene in a later Judicial proceeding to defend its decision—even if 
the private challengers drop out.”  136 S. Ct. at 2144; cf. Pers. Audio, 
LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(reaffirming that “[w]ith Article III satisfied as to the appellant, [the 
appellee] is not constitutionally excluded from appearing in court to 
                                                 
 263. Id. at  5–6. 
 264. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 8, Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Matal, No. 2016-1954 
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2017). 
 265. Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Iancu, 886 F.3d 1369, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  
 266. Id. (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)). 
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defend the PTAB decision in its favor”). The Director of the USPTO, 
thus, has standing.267 
Notably, the court referenced Personal Audio, LLC v. Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, for the principle that an appellee need not establish independent 
standing.268  Here, the court noted, where the original petitioner has withdrawn, 
the intervenor effectively steps into the shoes of the appellee.269   Thus, the court 
held the intervenor had standing where it had stepped into the shoes of the 
appellee, in effect avoiding the issue of whether intervenors are even required to 
demonstrate independent Article III standing.270 
VI.  AMICUS STANDING 
In contrast to appellants, appellees, and intervenors, an amicus curiae is not a 
party to the litigation.271  An amicus curiae, or a friend of the court, is any 
individual or entity that desires to express its views about a case and how the 
case may have broader implications beyond the immediate effects on the party 
to the case.272  As one commentator puts it, “amici curiae [are] nonparties who 
are nevertheless advocates, who are not bound by rules of standing and 
justiciability, or even rules of evidence, and who can present the court with new 
information and arguments.”273 
Therefore, an amicus does not need standing to file an amicus brief.274  If a 
potential intervenor is denied intervenor status, courts are likely to permit the 
party to participate as an amicus.275 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: PROCEDURAL, STRATEGIC 
CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING STANDING ON APPEAL 
 “Oh, sceptics and halfpenny philosophers, why do you halt half -way?”276 
As noted, the unsettled nature of many aspects of appellate standing at the 
Federal Circuit leaves open the chance for misapplication of precedent or 
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mistake.  Our hope is this Article can assist as a clear-eyed survey of the limited 
precedent here, and as a path forward for courts, practitioners, and others, free 
of advocacy or intent to influence.  To wit, the standing requirement on appeal 
from the PTAB generates numerous procedural and strategic issues, many of 
which remain unadressed.  Some of these are dictated by the law of the Supreme 
Court, other circuits, or the Federal Circuit—or at least by gaps in the law.  
Others may result from the lack (to date) of procedural rules at the Federal 
Circuit dictating how and when PTAB appeal standing issues are to be raised 
and resolved.  All merit further attention and study. 
What is clear, however, is that the Federal Circuit’s recent cases suggest a 
court struggling with the often-speculative but business-important reasons 
behind administrative challenges.  With the decisions in Altaire, the Court has 
recognized the need for some leeway in allowing challenges to proceed prior to 
financial harm occurring, but is wrestling with how much speculation and how 
conditional that harm can be.  As the court moves into this fraught area, it has 
recognized, appropriately if tacitly, that only the party seeking to invoke the 
Court’s jurisdiction need prove standing; and it has rejected the argument, now 
before the Supreme Court, that the estoppel provisions alone provide the type of 
harm justifying a petitioner’s appeal, though it has repeatedly noted that the 
estoppel may enhance or add to the concreteness of the harm.  And it has taken 
small steps toward embracing a standing jurisprudence broader than that limited 
solely to patent-centric DJ/infringement inquiries, in recognition of the standing 
inquiry’s flexible nature. 
A. Procedural 
The first issue is defining the party’s burden in demonstrating standing on 
appeal.  The Supreme Court notes clearly that “[t]he party invoking federal 
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.”277  What has been 
less clear is the amount and type of evidence necessary to meet that burden.  The 
courts have generally considered two possibilities: some courts have analogized 
the inquiry as to the one undertaken when ruling on a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim,278 while others have analogized the inquiry to the one 
undertaken when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.279 
The leading case among the circuits, and the most explicit about the timing of 
meeting that burden, is the D.C. Circuit decision in Sierra Club v. Environmental 
Protection Agency.280 (In general, the D.C. Circuit is the leading authority on 
appellate standing from administrative appeals.)  There the court noted that “a 
petitioner seeking review in the court of appeals does not ask the court merely 
                                                 
 277. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
 278. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898–900 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing standing 
approaches in regards to varying procedural postures); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 279. See Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 898–900; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 280. 292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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to assess the sufficiency of its legal theory[,]” such as in a motion to dismiss, but 
instead seeks “a final judgment on the merits, based upon the application of its 
legal theory to facts established by evidence in the record[,]” such that a party 
“must either identify in that record evidence sufficient to support its standing . . 
. or . . . submit additional evidence to the court of appeals.”281  Despite the normal 
judicial admonition against taking new evidence on appeal, given the unique 
posture forced upon appellate courts by the administrative appeal standing 
inquiry, the D.C. Circuit thought that this rule was “the most fair and orderly 
process by which to determine whether the petitioner has standing[,]” in part 
because petitioners are often best situated to produce evidence of their 
injuries.282  However, the court counseled that the petitioner must identify 
specific facts in the administrative record that support its standing argument or 
present “affidavits or other evidence” attached to its opening brief, unless 
standing is self-evident.283 
Another issue is when the parties should first raise the standing issue, as well 
as when the court should resolve it.  Many disputes about standing on appeal 
have been raised in motions to dismiss for a lack of standing; others have been 
raised in merits briefing.  Still others have raised it in motions to dismiss, only 
to have the issue shunted to the merits opinion, provoking a second round of 
briefing on the issue.  The approaches all have their own benefits and drawbacks. 
An alternative—and complementary—approach is used by the D.C. Circuit.  
In that court, when a party appeals for direct review of an agency decision, the 
party is then required to provide a statement describing its basis for standing in 
the docketing statement.284  D.C. Circuit Rule 15(c)(2) reads: “In cases involving 
direct review in this court of administrative actions, the docketing statement 
must contain a brief statement of the basis for the appellant’s or petitioner’s 
claim of standing.  This statement may include reference to arguments, evidence, 
or the administrative record supporting the claim of standing.”285  The rule was 
inspired in part by, and in other ways meant to anticipate the need for, the ruling 
in Sierra Club, which states: 
[A] petitioner whose standing is not self-evident should establish its 
standing by the submission of its arguments and any affidavits or other 
evidence appurtenant thereto at the first appropriate point in the 
review proceeding.  In some cases that will be in response to a motion 
to dismiss for want of standing; in cases in which no such motion has 
been made, it will be with the petitioner’s opening brief—and not, as 
in this case, in reply to the brief of the respondent agency.286 
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The D.C. Circuit’s rule advantageously requires the appellant to identify its 
basis for standing before briefing occurs, seemingly in recognition of the burden 
of persuasion it bears on that issue.  The information in the docketing statement 
will likely not be the complete evidence supporting standing, but it does provide 
the opposing party with an indication of whether there is a reasonable basis to 
establish standing or whether it should be challenged by a motion to dismiss 
before the briefing begins, and it provides a preview for the court itself that 
standing may be at issue in this particular appeal. 
Another question is whether evidence supporting standing can or should be 
developed during the PTAB proceeding.287  Overall, it seems unlikely that the 
PTAB proceeding would be a proper vehicle to develop this evidence.  The 
PTAB proceeding has limited discovery and limited opportunities to submit 
evidence concerning Article III standing.  For example, for a petitioner to 
establish Article III standing, the petitioner might have to provide evidence 
showing that the existence of the challenged patent would cause financial harm 
to the petitioner or that the petitioner is likely to be sued for patent 
infringement.288  However, those facts are rarely, if ever, relevant to any of the 
patentability grounds or procedural requirements that form the basis of the patent 
challenge.289  And standing will not be disputed in many cases because the 
petitioner has been sued or has been threatened with a suit for patent 
infringement, so a rule requiring evidence or demanding further inquiry would 
add unnecessary cost and complexity.  Regardless, even in those cases where 
standing is not immediately apparent, it seems unlikely that the PTAB 
proceeding will afford the parties the ability to develop and challenge evidence 
related to Article III standing. 
The issue of when the requirement of standing attaches continues unanswered.  
It is still unclear whether parties to an administrative proceeding below must 
possess standing (1) at the time of the filing, (2) throughout the earlier-filed 
proceeding, (3) at the time of the filing of the appeal, or (4) at the time the 
briefing of the standing issue commences.290  (There is a fifth option—one 
related to ripeness and mootness—where courts may suggest their standing is 
divested should some action occur post-briefing but prior to an issued panel 
opinion.  Such instances should be rare and heavily dependent on the facts of the 
case.291)  Conceptually, the first and third options present logical solutions to 
                                                 
 287. Indeed, during the Phigenix oral argument, Judge Dyk quest ioned why the appellant 
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this inquiry.  Tracing the standing inquiry to the filing of the administrative 
action analogizes the standing inquiry to a lower-court Article III trial, with the 
appellate court acting as the receiving body.  On the other hand, linking the 
standing inquiry to the filing of the appeal is logical because the appellant seeks 
to invoke the Article III standing of the appellate body alone. 
In cases like American Library Association v. Federal Communications 
Commission,292 the court adopted a test similar to the former concept.293  There, 
the issue centered on whether a rule adopted in 2005—prior to the start of the 
administrative action challenging it—harmed the American Library Association 
such that standing existed on appeal.294  That approach seems the norm, given 
that so many of the inquires focus on facts found below to the extent the agency 
record includes sufficient facts to show standing. 
The general case law on standing seems clear on this point.  Standing, and 
jurisdiction in general, is determined at the time the operative complaint is 
filed.295  In the context of district court litigation, the Federal Circuit has 
repeatedly looked at the facts that existed when the complaint was filed.296  
Furthermore, events that occur subsequent to the filing of the complaint may not 
be relied upon for showing jurisdiction at the time of the complaint.297 
Given this settled law, it is not surprising to see the Federal Circuit take the 
“at the time of filing” approach.  In PPG Industries, as discussed previously, the 
court held that the appellant had established Article III standing in an appeal of 
inter partes reexaminations from the PTAB.  In doing so, the court stated: 
The evidence shows that: (1) by the time PPG filed its notice of appeal 
in this case, it had already launched a commercial can-interior coating 
for the beverage can industry; and (2) PPG had received at least one 
inquiry from a customer suggesting that Valspar intended to pursue 
infringement litigation against PPG related to its can-interior 
coating.298 
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The court expressly stated that the evidence to be considered was that which 
existed “by the time PPG filed its notice of appeal.”299   This analysis is 
consistent with the Federal Circuit’s approach when assessing standing and 
jurisdiction in district court cases.  Contrast it with the Board’s ongoing inquiry 
in Momenta Pharmaceuticals v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, where actions taken post-
oral argument have provoked a show cause order why the appeal should not be 
dismissed as moot.300  This at least suggests that some judges view the standing 
(or at least, the justiciability) question as a live issue subject to change on 
appeal—and possibly, one that can be cured or remedied, even after an appeal is 
filed. 
Another possible approach would require Article III standing, for purposes of 
appeal, to exist at the time the AIA proceeding commences.  Specifically, the 
Federal Circuit could conceivably decide that the evidence necessary to establish 
standing must exist at the time the IPR petition is filed or instituted, not merely 
at the time notice of appeal is filed.  There may be advantages to this approach, 
but there does not appear to be any statutory or common law basis for such a 
position.301 
The final consideration is how practitioners should treat such affidavits, either  
as testimonial, evidentiary, or subject to deposition, objection, or any of the 
procedural safeguards that attach fact-finding in most instances.  As one 
commentator notes, “The procedurally strange thing . . . was that the affidavits 
were subject to none of the protections that normally would help ensure 
accuracy. There was no discovery, no cross-examination, and, obviously, the 
affiants’ credibility could not be fully weighed because they testified on paper, 
not before the court.”302  That point is well-taken.  There has been little 
discussion of anything other than allowing both sides to submit unchallenged 
affidavits into briefing—more akin to summary judgment than actual fact-
finding—although there is “no genuine issue of material fact.”303  It is worth 
asking if such unchallenged “fact-finding” in the first instance can withstand due 
process scrutiny, whereby one side can submit “evidence” unchallengeable in 
that or any other forum.304  It also means confidentiality and motions to seal 
information for the first time on appeal become more likely, but also present 
novel issues—as the appellate court is normally loathe to seal information or 
opinions for the first time on appeal.  In a situation where companies may 
routinely consider filing business confidential information, it may make sense 
for the clerks of court at the Federal Circuit to give greater leeway in sealing 
additional evidence; it may also counsel toward submitting such evidence under 
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a protective order and seal in the case below, as the Court has in the past been 
more solicitous to already-sealed information. 
B. Strategic Issues 
A party may also consider other factors when the issue of standing is or may 
be implicated in an appeal from the PTAB.  When multiple parties are involved,  
on one or both sides of an appeal, the court may be disinclined to dismiss a 
particular appellant, as long as at least one appellant clearly establishes 
standing.305  This is effectively the reasoning adopted in Personal Audio, which 
relied on ASARCO306 and Department of Labor v. Triplett307 for the idea that 
only one party before the court needs to demonstrate standing for an appeal to 
continue.308  While it is unclear how the Federal Circuit will accept the idea that 
only one party to the appeal is required to demonstrate standing, it does counsel 
for any entities who may face hurdles in establishing standing to consider 
strategic partnerships in filing petitions.  One dramatic example of this approach 
is Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. ,309 an appeal from a 
Declaratory Judgment Act case below.310  There, the plaintiff-appellees  
included: The Association for Molecular Pathology, the American College of 
Medical Genetics, and eighteen other associations and individuals.311  On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to proceed with 
the case because “at least one plaintiff, Dr. Harry Ostrer, has standing to 
challenge the validity of Myriad’s patents.”312 
Another strategic issue considers the possible implications of claim preclusion 
and issue preclusion based on a PTAB decision that cannot be appealed by the 
petitioner.313  If a party may not have standing on appeal, and the loss of a case 
would lead to a damage claim or issue preclusion, formal or otherwise, that party 
should weigh the benefits of invoking the PTAB’s jurisdiction, and the strength 
of its case, with the possibility of loss and adverse consequences. 
Parties with unique corporate structures, relationships, or business models 
should take extra precautions at the time of filing any administrative challenge 
to consider whether they may have standing to appeal, and should retain any 
evidence relevant to a potential future challenge, especially if maintaining a 
                                                 
 305. See U.S. Dep’t  of Labor v. Triplett , 494 U.S. 715, 732 (1990); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 
490 U.S. 605, 623–25, 623 n.2 (1989). 
 306. See Pers. Audio, LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(citing ASARCO Inc., 490 U.S. at 623–24, 623 n.2). 
 307. See id. (citing Triplett, 494 U.S. at 732 (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
 308. See id. at  1249–50. 
 309. 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013). 
 310. Id. at  1334. 
 311. Id. at  1329. 
 312. Id. at  1333–34. 
 313. Steinman, supra, note 16, at 898–900. 
698 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:605 
possible appeal becomes important to them.  This includes any issues arising 
from corporate structure, customer/supplier relationships, nonprofit or public 
interest missions, or third-party status. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Federal Circuit has recently adopted, for the first time, the largely 
settled law of appellant standing in the case of Phigenix.  It has adopted the more 
rational of two competing approaches to appellee standing in Personal Audio, 
finding that Article III standing need only be satisfied by the party invoking the 
court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit also held that the USPTO 
Director can independently have standing to appeal as an intervenor but  left 
open whether an intervenor must establish independent Article III standing.  
Thus, the Federal Circuit appears to be adopting the dominant view among the 
circuits, in an area of the law that needs further research, study, and guidance.  
 
